INTRODUCTION
"To say that customs have the force of laws in a country, where all the laws are written appears to us a contradiction."
1 Who pays for the wedding reception-the bride's parents or the newlyweds? Can a woman use her husband's surname after a divorce? These might seem like etiquette questions for Miss Manners, 2 but Louisiana courts have answered these questions by referring to custom, 3 a primary source of law in Louisiana. 4 These cases are rare, however; Louisiana courts usually reject a litigant's attempt to invoke custom. 5 When the courts do mention custom, they often mean conventional usage, a secondary source of Louisiana law. 5. See, e.g., Perry v. Allied Offshore Marine Corp., 618 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the alleged custom-a court's long-standing practice of hearing maintenance and cure cases by summary process-as it violated Louisiana procedural law).
6. See, e.g., Terrell v. Alexandria Auto Co., 125 So. 757, 759 (La. Ct. App. 1930) (in interpreting a contract of sale, the court referred to the business practice Some commentators consider jurisprudence constante-"an interpretation of a rule of law that has been accepted and applied by the courts in repeated decisions in a long line of cases" 7 -to be custom and thus binding law, but most Louisiana courts have stated that jurisprudence, even jurisprudence constante, is instead a secondary source of law with only persuasive effect. 8 This Article explores the historical basis of consuetudinary law and the definition of custom, including its characteristics, its distinction from usage, and its relation to jurisprudence. This Article examines the Louisiana Civil Code's treatment of custom and the legislative history of the 1987 revisions to the Louisiana Civil Code to determine what the Louisiana Legislature intended when it established custom as a primary source of law. The Article also surveys the Louisiana courts' treatment of custom, including the courts' confusion between custom and conventional usage and the requirements courts imposed to prove custom. Finally, the Article looks at the decline of custom as a primary source of law and attempts to determine whether customary law still exists in Louisiana.
I. HISTORICAL TRADITION OF CUSTOMARY LAW
Custom was the law of preliterate societies, 9 "preserved in the memory of old men." 10 Custom has been described as an "ancient, but now very often foreign, source of law." 11 In the sixth century, custom was recognized in Emperor Justinian's Digest. 12 The Digest, or Pandect, was a compilation of classical legal texts from the first century B.C. to the fourth century A.D.;
13 the Digest stated, "Custom of long standing is rightly regarded as law." 14 of delivering a car by driving it from the dealership to the purchaser's home as "the custom of the place").
7. MARY GARVEY ALGERO, LOUISIANA LEGAL RESEARCH 8-9 (3d ed. 2017). Both the objective and subjective parts are necessary. Repeated behavior that the community does not consider legally binding is merely conventional usage. 43 For example, standing for the national anthem and writing thank you notes are societal expectations. 44 Failure to do these acts may earn social disapprobation, 45 but no legal consequences result from their nonobservance. 46 As Gény explained, the requirement of "color of necessity (opinio necessitatis)" "excludes from its scope certain social practices which may be firmly established, but which would claim in vain the character of a source of positive private law, for the usage on which they are based does not imply any coercive idea." 47 Planiol stated that "there are controversies without end" regarding customary law's authority and nature. 48 Planiol himself believed custom could become an obligatory authority only after it had been "applied in adjudged cases" 49 but acknowledged that "the majority of modern authors deny that customary law originates with the courts." The first says that custom includes "practice, usages, received doctrine, and even the circumstances of social life." 52 The second "assimilates custom to usages of daily life, social, business, industrial, and agricultural, and even the rules of etiquette and moral and religious practices." 53 The third limits custom to case law. 54 French law professor and Dean Yvon Loussouarn was of the opinion that the first was too broad, the second 43. Kadens 
B. Usage Distinguished from Custom
Louisiana legislators apparently agreed with Loussouarn that none of the three French schools of thought were correct. The first two include usages, "a much broader, less-demanding concept than custom," 56 although even statutory texts often "improperly classif[y]" usages as custom. 57 Planiol stated that the nature of usages was "quite different from that of Custom." 58 He explained that when usages were adopted in contracts, they were "freely adopted," as opposed to customs, which were "imposed upon them." 59 He further noted that "usages followed by individuals are absolutely without force" and that a "usage is merely a fact." 60 Gény explained that usages include "all the manifestations of society which remain outside the positive legal order"-"the habits of daily life, . . . the mores of the people or of certain social classes, the commercial and other economic usages, the rules of civil behavior, the social conventions, or even moral and religious practices." 61 The lack of a coercive ideation, however, prevents them from becoming positive law.
62
The Louisiana Civil Code distinguishes custom from usage and specifically refers to usage in articles on interpretation of contracts, 63 explaining that a usage is "a practice regularly observed." 64 Article 4 provides that the courts may resort to "justice, reason, and prevailing usages" in the absence of custom or legislation. . This is similar to article 7 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, which provides: "When there is no statute applicable to the case at issue, the court shall decide in accordance with equity, which means that natural justice, as embodied in the general principles of jurisprudence and in accepted and established usages and customs, shall be taken into consideration." P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 7 (2018).
The comments to article 1 explain that legislation and custom, the primary sources of law, "are contrasted with persuasive or secondary sources of law, such as . . . conventional usages . . . that may guide the court in reaching a decision in the absence of legislation and custom."
66

C. Jurisprudence Is Not Custom
Louisiana legislators and judges have rejected the third school of thought-that judicial decisions are customary law. The comments to article 1 of the Civil Code explicitly state that jurisprudence is "persuasive or secondary" and that courts should use it only in the absence of legislation and custom. 67 
A. Civil Code Revision of 1987
The preliminary title of the Louisiana Civil Code was revised in 1987. Article 1 now provides: "The sources of law are legislation and custom."
77
The 1987 Revision Comments state that, "[a]ccording to civilian doctrine, legislation and custom are authoritative or primary sources of law."
78 The comments further state that "legislation is the superior source of law in Louisiana";
79 that "legislation is superior to any other source of law"; 80 and that a judge "may look for solutions elsewhere" only when the case is "not covered by legislation."
81
The definition of custom in article 3 was changed in 1987. It now reads: "Custom results from practice repeated for a long time and generally accepted as having acquired the force of law." 82 The comments state that this definition "reproduces the substance" of the previous version and "does not change the law." 83 The revision added the following to article 3: "Custom may not abrogate legislation." 84 The comments reiterate that "[l]egislation and custom are primary sources of law," but "legislation is the superior source of law in Louisiana." The theory that judicial precedents are not a source of law admits an apparent exception. In Louisiana and in France, a long line of decisions on a certain subject may be taken to establish rules of customary law. This is the doctrine of "settled jurisprudence" (jurisprudence constante). Courts must follow this jurisprudence as customary law rather than as merely precedents. In France, this exception rests on doctrinal considerations; in Louisiana, there is legislative foundation for it in Articles 3 and 21 of the Civil Code.
112
In the December 1985 meeting, the Committee members discussed whether jurisprudence could be a primary source of law. Two of the members worried that the new language of article 1, stating that legislation and custom were "[t]he sources of law," "would mean that one could interpret the article as allowing the use of doctrine and jurisprudence as sources of law. They did not want this result." 113 Yiannopoulos "argued that a tradition of Louisiana was that jurisprudence was not a source of law. He explained that his comments explained that jurisprudence was a 'secondary' source of law and distinguishable from a 'primary' source of law."
114
The Committee then considered deleting articles 1-3, but Professor Katherine Spaht "urged the Committee to retain the articles, since they were used to emphasize that there was no judge-made law. She argued that the legislature would oppose the absence of those articles." 115 In that meeting, the Committee also amended the proposed language of article 3 "to clarify that custom resulted from a practice by the people and not by the courts."
116
When the Council met to discuss the recommendations of the committee, 117 Yiannopoulos began by explaining that the language of 112. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 35, at 101 (emphasis added). Articles 3 and 21, referred to in the quotation, are the articles from the original version of the Louisiana Civil Code in effect from 1808 to 1986, concerning custom and usages. Article 3 provided: "Customs result from a long series of actions constantly repeated, which have by such repetition and by uninterrupted acquiescence acquired the force of a tacit and common consent." LA. CIV. CODE art. 3 (1986) (revised 1987). Article 21 provided: "In all civil matters, where there is no express laws, the judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent." LA. CIV. CODE art. 21 (1986) former article 1-"Law is a solemn expression of legislative will"-"was part of Louisiana tradition and was used by our courts as authority for the principle that judge-made-law was not law."
118 Some Council members argued that under the Louisiana Constitution, only the legislature could make laws. 119 The Council temporarily adopted a motion indicating that custom was a secondary source of law, 120 but ultimately acceded to the comment to article 1 that both legislation and custom were primary sources. During all of the meetings, however, custom was referred to as law created by the people, and the possibility that jurisprudence could rise to the level of custom as jurisprudence constante was never discussed.
The language of articles 1 and 3 as drafted by the Law Institute was submitted as House Bill number 1136. 121 The bill was reported favorably by the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure on May 13, 1987, 122 and was passed unanimously on May 15, 1987, as Act number 124, exactly as drafted.
123
IV. LOUISIANA COURTS' TREATMENT OF CUSTOM As noted at the outset, Louisiana cases applying custom are rare. Often what the court calls custom is actually usage. Some attempts to use custom are rejected for lack of proof; others are rejected because the asserted custom is contrary to legislation or the contract between the parties. And the facts that gave rise to the rare cases decided using custom in the last century would probably not recur today.
A. Usage Cases
Despite the clear distinction between custom and usage in the Civil Code, Louisiana courts tend to confuse and conflate the terms, 124 Thus, courts either refer to "custom or usage," without attempting to determine which actually applies in a particular case, 126 or courts refer to something as custom that can be only usage. For example, in the case regarding payment for the wedding reception, the court noted the bride's testimony "that it is common custom for the parents of the bride to pay for the wedding reception."
127 Instead of relying on custom as a primary source of law, the court affirmed the judgment dismissing the bride from the lawsuit by stating that "in the absence of express law, common custom or received usages are examined in an appeal to equity." 128 Similarly, in the case of the ex-wife who wanted to continue to use her former husband's surname, the court stated that it could "look to established custom and equity for assistance in deciding" the case. 129 The court noted Planiol's writings that a woman had no right to use her husband's name after a divorce. The court also took judicial notice of "the generally existent custom under which divorced women are known by a combination of their Christian name, their family surname, and their former husband's surname,"
130 and recognized the right of a woman to revert to her maiden name after divorce. 131 The court concluded that in "modern life," divorce had "provoked the establishment of its own customs," including the "generally acknowledged acceptability of the use of the husband's surname by his former spouse."
132 Accordingly, a divorced woman can use her maiden name or her husband's surname. Without a widespread sense that she is legally required to do one or the other, however, only a usage has been shown, not a custom. Thus, although the court stated it was using "established custom and equity" to decide the case, the court actually applied a usage. 
B. Proof of Custom
French courts in the 18th century required proof of custom through inquests, called turba, of at least ten local persons who were "thought likely to know or remember" the customary law. 133 Proof of the custom required that ten people agree to the existence of the custom for it to be binding. 134 Later, the number increased to 20 as two turba were required.
135
Louisiana law did not adopt any specific requirements for proof of custom. While the jurisprudence is unclear as to the burden of proof of custom, courts tend to reject assertions of custom due to insufficient proof. One of the first cases regarding proof of custom arose in 1834 in Broussard v. Bernard, when an heir attempted to prove through parol evidence certain customs regarding community property law and "that the Fuero Real of the kingdom of Spain, was in force, where the succession was opened." 136 The court found that parol evidence could not prove custom, stating that "[t]he recognition of customs, by our Code, necessarily admitted proof, other than that required to establish laws." 137 The court, however, remanded the case for the introduction of certain documentary evidence that the trial judge originally rejected. 138 Similarly, in 1841, the court rejected a claim by a ship's captain that he was entitled to a certain commission on freight according to "the usage and custom of merchants in New Orleans." 139 The court held the evidence of the custom was insufficient, stating that "when a custom is relied on, it must be established by evidence, the private knowledge of the jury will not authorize a verdict without the proof . . . and custom cannot be regarded as law until a long and uninterrupted prevalence is proved."
140
In 1917, an attorney-who had given up his legal practice in favor of real-estate investing-attempted to avoid paying a fee to another attorney who had worked on his case for six years, citing the "custom of courtesy," i.e., members of one profession did not charge others in the same profession.
141 A dozen practitioners and judges were called to testify, and the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove a binding legal 133 custom; most of the witnesses followed the rule, but the witnesses believed the rule could be disregarded under the right circumstances. 142 The court added, however, that "a case might, perhaps, be presented in which that rule would be applied as the law which should govern it."
143
In a recent case involving a dispute between two municipalities and the parish police jury over who was responsible for paying the preadjudicative expenses for housing juveniles the municipalities arrested, the court relied on Bernard. 144 The towns claimed that the police jury had paid the expenses in the past and that this "custom and practice" was sufficient to obligate the police jury to pay in this situation as well.
145
Without explaining what proof was necessary, the court rejected the custom argument due to insufficient evidence, stating that the jurisprudence regarding proof of custom has "remained unchallenged" since Bernard.
146
An odd example of proof of custom is found in the wedding reception case. The plaintiff in that case-the reception hall-initially sued only the bride and later added her parents as defendants. 147 Despite provisions in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure that allow a plaintiff to amend the petition to add further defendants, 148 the court stated that the plaintiff had "tacitly acknowledged" the custom that the bride's family pays for the reception when it initially sued the bride and not the groom. The court found the tacit acknowledgment was sufficient proof of this "common custom."
149
One clear tenet regarding proof of custom is that the party seeking to invoke a custom must prove that both parties were aware of the rule sought to be declared custom. 150 The decisions establishing this tenet are logical, as the parties must be under the conviction that the rule has the force of law-which is difficult to show when one party is unaware of the rule. If the parties are residents of the same area and one does not know of the rule, the rule does not meet the "widespread observance" requirement. 151 As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, "When . . . the question is of a custom or usage, and it is not known to those who, from business and connections, have the best means of knowing it, the ignorance of it is, in some sense, positive testimony of its non-existence." 152 Furthermore, a rule that is widely known within an area cannot be applied as customary law to a non-resident who is unaware of the rule. 153 For example, in 1909, a theater company offered an actor an employment contract "'for the season'" but fired him after giving two weeks' notice. 154 The defendant testified that all employment contracts, "in theatrical parlance, carry two weeks' notice on either side." 155 The actor, however, who was from Columbus, Ohio, testified he had never heard of the custom. 156 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of the so-called custom, stating: "The usage of a particular place or a particular class of persons cannot be binding on non-residents or on any person, unless they are shown to have been cognizant of it." 157 Requiring proof that both parties knew of the custom seems to conflict with "the legal maxims that 'all are presumed to know the law' and that 'ignorance of the law is no excuse,'" 158 which are codified in Louisiana Civil Code article 5. 159 These maxims, which arise out of Roman civil law, 160 are "founded upon considerations of public policy and necessity [and] should be adhered to in most instances." 161 The presumption that all people know the law, however, is legally sound only when the law is "certain and capable of being ascertained." 162 Although Roman law at the time of the Digest was largely based on custom, it was "definite and knowable" because it was "well integrated with the community mores of the time." 163 Modern statutory law is made definite and knowable through enactment and publication of notice; 164 after the promulgation of a law, each person is charged with knowledge of the law. 165 As custom is not made public in this manner, the application of customary law to persons who have no notice of the law does not comport with modern notions of due process. 166 
C. Custom Cannot Abrogate Legislation
Even before the 1987 revision to article 3-explicitly stating that custom cannot abrogate legislation-Louisiana courts adopted the principle that custom could trump neither legislation nor the contract between the parties. 167 One of the earliest cases arose in 1832, when a plaintiff demanded rescission of an entire sale of 401 coils of bale rope, when only some of the rope was of unmerchantable quality. 168 The law was clear that he was entitled to return only the bad rope and not all of it. Plaintiff asserted, however, that "a custom, or commercial usage in New Orleans," authorized return of the whole parcel if part of the order was defective. 169 The court held: "[W]here the law is express, no man or set of men can create a custom for their own benefit or convenience, and give to that custom a force paramount to that of the law."
170
The same principle was applied 150 years later when the defendants asserted that a savings and loan's ("the S&L") practice of permitting sales with assumption of the previous owner's mortgage prevented the company from enforcing the "due-on-sale" clause in the defendants' mortgage. 171 The defendants' home was financed by the S&L's mortgage. 172 The mortgage contained a due-on-sale clause that required the company's consent to a sale with assumption of mortgage, which would transfer the obligations under the mortgage to any subsequent purchaser of the home. 173 When the defendants executed a sale with assumption without the S&L's consent, the S&L foreclosed.
174
The court rejected the defendants' argument that the S&L's prior practice of permitting sales with assumption created a custom. 175 The court found there was both an express contractual provision and an express Louisiana statute permitting the enforcement of the due-on-sale clause.
176
The court stated, "Jurisprudence construing Civil Code Article 3 has established the rule that neither 'custom' nor 'usage' nor 'practice' may prevent the enforcement of an express statutory provision."
177
D. True Custom Cases
It is necessary to go back to the early 20th century to find cases of true custom. One such case, from 1927, involved the question of whether an estate was responsible for the cost of the decedent's headstone. 178 The decedent's sister had ordered the grave marker, but she subsequently opposed payment by the estate in the estate's final accounting and homologation. 179 The court denied her opposition, citing Civil Code article 3 and stating: "The expenditure of a reasonable sum out of the estate of a party who has died for the purpose of marking his grave is authorized by a custom, so long existing that it has acquired the force and effect of a law." 180 Another case in which the court applied custom with the force of law arose in 1935. This case involved an overseer of a large cotton plantation at its option, to declare due and payable sums secured by the lender's security instrument if all or any part of the property, or an interest therein, securing the real property loan is sold or transferred without the lender's prior written consent." 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)(1) (2012 who was fired in August despite being hired for "the year." 181 The court stated that the rule that overseers were hired for the calendar year was so well known that a court could take judicial notice of the custom "without allegation or proof." 182 Today it is difficult to imagine a headstone being sold or a manager being employed for a large agricultural holding without a written agreement; for this reason, cases of this nature are unlikely to arise again.
V. MODERN DIMINISHMENT OF CUSTOM
Although most civil law systems today accept custom as a source of law, the importance of custom has declined in modern legal systems. 183 In fact, John Henry Merryman commented in 1969 that the "amount of writing on custom as law in civil law jurisdictions is immense, far out of proportion to its actual importance as law. . . . [T]he importance of custom as a source of law is slight and decreasing." 184 Custom fills the lacunae in the statutes, but Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Mack Barham commented in 1974 that the historical meaning of custom "is not applicable in modern society as frequently as it was when our code was adopted." 185 A 1962 law review article written by Albert Tate, Jr. is an indication of the diminished status of customary law. 186 Tate, a state appellate judge who would go on to serve on the Louisiana Supreme Court, stated the "principal formal sources used by a Louisiana judge" were the Civil Code and the statutes, doctrine, and precedent. 187 Tate's only mention of custom was in a footnote, wherein he stated he was omitting discussion of custom because it was "used with relative infrequency in deciding civil litigation in our state courts." 188 Custom has declined in importance for three primary reasons: (1) a strong legislature; (2) a more diverse population; and (3) our everchanging modern society. 189 As Gény explained in 1899, "[A]s social relations become more complex, as ethnical groups fuse, and as the national aspirations are changed under the influence of cosmopolitism which makes a strong political centralization necessary, the force of customary law recedes in the face of the constantly growing role of written legislation." 190 Yiannopoulos stated that customary law flourishes when there is "no central power sufficiently strong to make new laws and to enforce obedience to the old," but declines " [d] uring periods of strength and of good organization." According to Yiannopoulos, this explains custom's decline in importance. 191 Louisiana currently has a strong legislature with power to make new laws and enforce old ones, and thus application of customary law is unnecessary.
Customary law is strongest as a source of law in "small and closely knit communities, which often do not share the modern needs for fixed laws." 192 Louisiana now has almost 4.7 million people 193 of many races, 194 ethnicities, cultures, 195 and religions. 196 It is difficult to imagine an uncodified practice that all, or even most, Louisiana citizens believe to be a binding legal obligation. The "custom" Yiannopoulos gave as an example during the Law Institute meetings-a wife taking her husband's name upon marriage-was not considered a binding legal obligation in 1987 by most people and is certainly not considered binding today. 197 Sixty years ago, in 1958, Dean Loussouarn noted that custom forms too slowly to keep up with the fast evolution of modern society. 198 Yiannopoulos echoed this notion in 1974, stating that "the formation of customs is too slow to cope with the growing demands of a developing society." 199 With the advent of computers and the internet, the world moves even faster today. The likelihood of an uncodified practice being followed for a "long time" with the belief that it is legally binding seems exceedingly slim in today's world.
CONCLUSION
Louisiana is now too diverse and populous for any uncodified practice to be both repeated for a long period of time and generally accepted as bearing a legal obligation. The only remaining source of law Louisiana courts might consider to be custom is jurisprudence constante, a doctrine the legislature never intended to be a primary source of law.
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Despite the Louisiana Supreme Court's recent statements that jurisprudence, even when it becomes jurisprudence constante, is only a
